Street smarts by Curry, Devin Sanchez




Devin Sanchez Curry 
Forthcoming in Synthese 
 
Abstract: A pluralistic approach to folk psychology must countenance the evaluative, regulatory, 
predictive, and explanatory roles played by attributions of intelligence in social practices across 
cultures. Building off of the work of the psychologist Robert Sternberg and the philosophers 
Gilbert Ryle and Daniel Dennett, I argue that a relativistic interpretivism best accounts for the 
many varieties of intelligence that emerge from folk discourse. To be intelligent (in the sense 
invoked in folk psychological practices) is to be comparatively good at solving intellectual 
problems that an interpreter deems worth solving. 
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1. Some people are smarter than other people 
 Folk psychological practices are largely geared towards identifying differences between 
people’s minds, and intelligence is one salient mental dimension along which people differ. In 
the leadup to the 2020 U.S. presidential election, commentators have incessantly informed the 
public about the intelligence of its would-be leaders. Harris, herself “very smart” (Weil 2019), 
wrote Smart on Crime. “On substance, Warren and Sanders are close, except Warren has clearer 
plans, in part because she is smarter” (Leiter 2019). Indeed, if Sanders (who has called himself 
“dumb” (AP 2019) for ignoring heart attack symptoms) and the “moron” Biden (Baumann 2019) 
falter in the Democratic primaries, we may be looking forward to “Warren vs. Buttigieg: Battle of 
the eggheads” (Strauss 2019). Trump is either an “extremely stable genius” (Wiedenkeller 2019) 
or “grade-A idiot” (Echavarri 2019), depending on whom you ask, and is himself enamored of 
calling his political rivals “dumb as a rock” (Trump 2013–2019). 
 This is pluralistic folk psychology in action. Attributions of mental characteristics other 
than beliefs and desires are being used to evaluate, and to a lesser extent to predict, explain, 
interpret, and—via media pressure and the voting booth—regulate candidates’ behavior. This 
folk psychological practice is not restricted to the political domain. As Ken Richardson remarks,  
 
Such a concept, and a word (or words) for it, has been found in every known society, 
including contemporary tribal societies, in various parts of the world. In everyday 
discourse today, “intelligent” must be one of the most commonly used terms for 
describing people. Indeed, people tend to use the term remarkably freely to describe 
others, and seem to be able to spot it extremely quickly. Interview panels think they can 
find it, or not, in their candidates in half an hour of searching questions. Teachers usually 
have no hesitation in describing their pupils as intelligent or not (often in the form of 
euphemisms like “bright” or “dull”). Parents often look for telltale signs of it in their own 
children—according to some reports, even in the first few days of life! (Richardson 2000: 
1–2)  
 
As a rule, humans believe that some people are smarter than other people. We are deeply 
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concerned with figuring out who is smart and who is not, in order to better understand and more 
fruitfully interact with the intelligent and unintelligent alike. 
 In the 20th century, the folk recruited a new scientific way of assessing smarts—the IQ 
test—in service of the same old folk psychological ends. (Trump, for example, has called Biden 
“another low IQ individual” (Lai & Yourish 2019).) Despite the fecundity of research on g—a 
statistical factor capturing the intercorrelations between individuals’ scores on different IQ 
tests—in differential psychology, the construct has been little discussed by philosophers. This 
neglect can be partly explained by the lack of any sustained discussion of intelligence in the 
subfields of cognitive science—including cognitive psychology—traditionally studied by 
philosophers of mind and science. Researchers are beginning to build bridges between 
differential and cognitive psychology, but to this day they remain largely separate enterprises 
(Neisser et al. 1996; Haier 2017: 124–126). Thus, despite an ever-growing philosophical literature 
analyzing scientific research on cognition and reasoning, the last major work in philosophy of 
science on the interpretation of IQ tests was written forty-five years ago, when Ned Block and 
Gerald Dworkin (1974) offered a series of strong arguments against the view that g is a reliable 
measure of intelligence (as conceived in folk discourse).1 
 As a folk psychological kind, intelligence is even less discussed in the philosophical 
literature.2 Substantive discussion of attributions of intelligence (or stupidity) was absent from 
the folk psychology wars of the 80s, 90s, and 00s (Stich 1983; Fodor 1987, Dennett 1987, 
Churchland 1988, Nichols & Stich 2003; Goldman 2006), and has not shown up in the pluralistic 
folk psychology revival (McGeer 2007; Andrews 2012; Zawidzki 2013; Spaulding 2018; Westra 
2018). People are obsessed with taking stock of people’s intelligence. Yet there is no extant 
scientifically informed philosophical account of this phenomenon. 
 In this article, I develop a philosophical account of what I term ‘folk psychological 
intelligence’: the object of lay intelligence attributions. In §2, I discuss empirical evidence which 
suggests that a pluralistic account of folk psychology must explain how lay attributions of 
intelligence function in diverse manners across cultures and generations. Part of the required 
explanation is metaphysical: what, if anything, is this attribute—intelligence—which fascinates 
humans? In §3, I canvass extant psychological theories of intelligence which purport to address 
this metaphysical question. In §4, I supplement Robert Sternberg’s theory of successful 
intelligence with insights from the philosophy of mind in order to make the case for a relativistic 
interpretivism about folk psychological intelligence. On my view, when folks call somebody 
smart (or stupid), they are not speculating about cognitive mechanisms. Instead, they are 
claiming that the person is (not) comparatively good at solving intellectual problems that the 
attributor deems worth solving. In §5, I suggest further directions for research on folk 
psychological intelligence, the scientific construct g, and the relationship between the two. 
 
2. Intelligence in folk psychology 
 Like the philosophy of intelligence, the psychological study of conceptions of intelligence 
 
1 An exception: Clark Glymour’s (1998) incisive critique of the methodology of The Bell Curve. 
2 A partial exception: Hubert Dreyfus’s (2014) masterful work on skillful coping, which has important 
affinities with the account of intelligence developed in this article. 
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across cultural contexts is surprisingly underdeveloped, especially relative to the reams of cross-
cultural psychometric data collected over the last century. Nevertheless, evidence backs up three 
claims that should be obvious, on reflection, to anyone embroiled in human social life: (a) that 
attributions of intelligence pervade social affairs, serving (b) predictions and explanations, as well 
as (c) evaluations and regulation, of behavior. In this section, I review the evidence for these three 
claims in turn. Together, these reviews amount to an argument that a pluralistic approach to folk 
psychology must explain how lay attributions of intelligence function diversely across cultures, 
while remaining attributions of intelligence (rather than something else). 
 
2a. Pervasiveness of attributions of intelligence 
 All people everywhere think about intelligence. We often attribute intelligence (or its 
dearth) to characterize people of all ages (Berg & Sternberg 1992), including ourselves (Freund & 
Kasten 2012). And the ‘we’ here is universal: notions of intelligence have been found in every 
culture investigated (Serpell 2000; Cocodia 2014; Saklofske et al. 2015), and “expert” intelligence 
researchers often attribute intelligence in the same manners, and for the same purposes, as 
nonexperts (Sternberg et al. 1981; Nevo & Khader 1995). At the same time, the empirical literature 
reveals that attributions of intelligence serve a panoply of purposes across cultures. These include 
the purposes traditionally associated with folk psychology: the prediction and explanation of 
behavior. 
 
2b. Prediction and explanation 
 People across cultures conceptually link intelligence and earned success (Sternberg 1997). 
Indeed, the strongest argument that IQ tests adequately measure intelligence relies on the fact 
that IQ is strongly correlated with a wide range of measures of success in life (Neisser et al. 1996), 
including educational attainment, job complexity, income, and even “individuals’ odds of dealing 
successfully with the ordinary demands of modern life (such as banking, using maps and 
transportation schedules, reading and understanding forms, interpreting news articles)” 
(Gottfredson 1997: 79). With the possible exception of conscientiousness, g is the single best 
predictor of job performance among psychological constructs (Gottfredson 2018). Intelligence is 
so strongly linked to success in the popular imagination that the correlation between test scores 
and success has convinced many that the test scores must directly measure intelligence (cf. 
Richardson & Norgate 2015). 
 The conceptual link between intelligence and earned success is strong enough that 
conceptions of the two consistently covary. Parents of schoolchildren belonging to different 
ethnic groups in the United States emphasize different varieties of success, and, accordingly, 
conceptualize intelligence differently. Caucasian and Asian parents who emphasize scholastic 
achievement tend to conceptualize intelligence as centrally involving analytical abilities, whereas 
Latinx parents who emphasize interpersonal success tend to conceptualize intelligence as 
centrally involving social competence (Okagaki & Sternberg 1993). The Chewa people of Zambia, 
meanwhile, take intelligence to centrally involve obedience and cooperation: traits which are 
conducive to the success of the community as well as the individual (Serpell 1974; 1976). The Luo 
people of Kenya use four distinct terms to mean knowledge-based intelligence, respect-based 
intelligence, practice-based intelligence, and initiative-based intelligence, respectively, and 
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conceive of four corresponding varieties of success (Grigorenko et al. 2001). In each of these cases, 
differing conceptions of earned success imply equally differing conceptions of intelligence. 
 The folk frequently exploit this conceptual connection to predict and explain successful 
behavior on the basis of intelligence. We predict that smart people are likely to succeed, and often 
explain people’s earned successes in life by reference to their smarts. Similarly, we predict 
struggles for the stupid, and often explain people’s failures by reference to their stupidity. These 
generalizations about folk psychological practice are remarkably apt across cultural contexts 
(Sternberg 2004). Nevertheless, the varieties of success and failure that people predict and explain 
by reference to intelligence vary widely, due to cross-cultural covariance in conceptions of success 
and intelligence (Berry 1997; Greenfield 1997; Sternberg & Kaufman 1998). 
 Consider a study conducted by Robert Sternberg and Elena Grigorenko (2004: 1429–1430) 
in Usenge, Kenya. Usengean children, greater than 95% of whom are afflicted with parasite-borne 
illnesses, use herbal medicines to treat themselves and others. Sternberg and Grigorenko tested 
the children’s knowledge of, and ability to apply, these natural remedies. They also gave children 
standard IQ tests designed to measure fluid intelligence—domain-general abstract reasoning 
ability—and crystallized intelligence—domain-specific, knowledge-based reasoning ability—
respectively. They found that Usengean children’s facility with herbal remedies was uncorrelated 
with measures of fluid intelligence. More strikingly, they found that it was negatively correlated 
with a measure of crystallized intelligence that tested Usengean children’s facility with English 
vocabulary. (Usengeans speak English in school.) 
 In interpreting this result, Sternberg and Grigorenko note that scholastic achievement 
does not do much, practically speaking, for Usengean children. Dropping out of school is not seen 
as a failure, much less an indicator of stupidity; on the contrary, “many families in the village do 
not particularly value formal western schooling.” They value survival and healing skills “that 
will lead to successful adaptation to the environments in which they will really live” (Sternberg 
and Grigorenko 2004: 1429). Dedication to school is taken as a sign of lack of dedication to the 
skills required for success in Usengean society: some people refuse to take eggheaded kids (with 
their screwed-up priorities) on as apprentices. In this context, the smart kids predictably skip 
school. Likewise, an Usengean might explain the neighbor kid always having her nose in a book 
by noting that she always seemed a bit dull. Such predictions and explanations rely on a reversal 
of the stereotypes for intelligence and stupidity that dominate “WEIRD”—Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, Democratic—contexts (Henrich et al. 2010). Usengean and WEIRD children 
do not have radically different cognitive makeups, such that people’s intrinsic intelligence leads 
to radically different behaviors in the two contexts, thereby validating opposite predictions and 
explanations. Rather, differing conceptions of intelligence arise alongside differing conceptions 
of earned success, which have more to do with the environments in which people are raised than 
people themselves. 
 The preceding paragraphs admittedly paint with too broad a brush. WEIRD countries like 
the United States are home to many subcultures and ideologies, with distinctive conceptions of 
intelligence and success (Dweck & Bempechat 1983; Sternberg and Grigorenko 2004: 1433). 
Moreover, folks often recognize distinctions between varieties of intelligence, such as ‘book 
smarts’ versus ‘street smarts’. But the central present point is that many conceptions of 
intelligence, tied up with many conceptions of success, pervade folk psychological discourse. 
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That variation in conceptions exists within cultures—and even within individuals—as well as 
between cultures is further evidence that an empirically adequate account of folk psychological 
intelligence must mind the differences. 
 The link between conceptions of intelligence and earned success is also suggestive of 
another important role of intelligence attribution. Pluralistic approaches to folk psychological 
rightly draw attention to the normativity built into folk psychological practice (McGeer 2007; 
Andrews 2017; Spaulding 2018; Almagro Holgado & Fernández Castro forthcoming). This 
emphasis on normativity is crucial for understanding folk psychological intelligence in particular. 
Even when attributions of intelligence are geared toward prediction and explanation, they are 
geared toward the prediction and explanation of certain varieties of successful behavior, which is 
an irreducibly normative notion. In particular, across cultures, to attribute intelligence seems to 
be to deem somebody good at solving certain intellectual problems (which I term ‘puzzles’). 
(Intelligence is presumably predictive and explanatory of broader success in life because solving 
puzzles is crucial to earning success.) This built-in normativity enables evaluations—and 
responses thereto—which go well beyond cold assessments of success or failure. 
 
2c. Evaluation and regulation 
 In addition to being irreducibly normative, attributions of intelligence are irreducibly 
comparative: they are attributions of how good people are at solving puzzles as compared to 
other people. Smart people tackle puzzles better than most of their peers. Dumb people tackle 
puzzles worse than most of their peers. Being comparatively good at puzzle-solving is a multi-
dimensional affair. For intellectual problems that have solutions, being good at puzzle-solving 
partly means being able to come up with those solutions. But even among successful puzzle-
solvers, there are degrees and respects of adeptness; some are better than others at finding the 
optimal (rather than just any old) solution to puzzles they already know how to solve, or are 
quicker on the uptake when learning how to tackle novel puzzles, or have a deeper or broader 
understanding of general puzzle-solving techniques (which allows for greater transferability). 
These (and other) dimensions of aptitude are incorporated in many folks’ conceptions of 
intelligence. 
What counts as puzzle-solving—and aptitude for puzzle-solving—differs from context to 
context. But the normative and comparative aspects of folk psychological intelligence are 
constants across contexts. Together, these aspects subserve the evaluative and regulatory goals of 
lay intelligence attribution. In many cultures, earned success—and thus intelligence, as a 
propensity therefor—is considered indicative of moral virtue (Das 1994). Social norm flounting 
is perceived as indicating low intelligence, whereas virtuous action is perceived as indicating high 
intelligence (Levine & White 1986). Meanwhile, people seek intelligent romantic partners, and 
overestimate the IQs of the romantic partners they end up with, even more than they overestimate 
their own (Gignac & Zajenkowski 2019).  
Although attributions of intelligence play some such evaluative and regulatory roles 
across cultures, many studies reveal culture-bound quirks which suggest that the precise 
normative roles they play vary widely (Wober 1974; Ogbu 1988; Mugny & Carugati 1989; Rogoff 
1990, 2003; Chen & Chen 1992; Zhang & Wu 1994; Yang & Sternberg 1997; Swami et al. 2008). 
Usengean parents pressure their promising children to drop out of school and find 
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apprenticeships; American parents sign them up for SAT classes (and allow their tax dollars to 
pay truancy officers’ salaries). 
 This literature provides a nice backdrop for interpreting the Flynn Effect—the finding that 
mean IQ test results improved dramatically over the course of the 20th century (Flynn 1987)—and 
its recent reversal in some European countries (Dutton et al. 2016). James Flynn himself interprets 
IQ trends as “dictated by altered social priorities that affect the cognitive problems habitually 
confronted and deemed worth solving” in changing social contexts. If Flynn is right, and the 
evidence suggests he is (Nisbett 2009; Bratsberg & Rogeberg 2018), then massive IQ gains in the 
20th century can be chalked up to “these priorities and habits of mind [which] have changed 
radically as societies begin to industrialize” (Flynn 2016: 121). A scientific understanding of the 
Flynn Effect will thus require diachronic research programs which correlate changes in IQ test 
performance with environmental changes, including shifts in habits of mind. 
 As conceptions of intelligence change, more resources are put into training young people 
on relevant skills, leading to more of the corresponding variety of intelligence in the next 
generation. This is a prime example of “mindshaping” (Zawidzki 2013): folk psychological 
practices regulate people’s cognitive capacities, nudging them into adhering more to the 
idiosyncratic conceptions of intelligence that folks find useful for predicting, explaining, and 
evaluating behaviors in context. You likely have a higher IQ than your grandparent. But that does 
not mean you are smarter tout court; rather, your grandparent honed their intelligence in light of 
a different conception thereof, which prepared them for different puzzles. Again, across 
generations as well as across cultures, there is a constant amidst the flux. How we conceptualize 
intelligence changes over time. But that we conceptualize intelligence—that we care about who 
is better than whom at solving puzzles—is a human universal. 
 The point of the preceding bird’s-eye literature review is twofold. First, the evidence 
establishes the pervasiveness of intelligence attributions in folk psychology. Second, the evidence 
characterizes conceptions of intelligence (and its associated puzzles) as varying from context to 
context, even while intelligence is universally considered a capacity to solve puzzles 
comparatively well. 
 So, are people around the world onto something when they talk about intelligence? And, 
if so, what in the world are they onto? 
 
3. Psychological theories of intelligence 
There may be at least as many conceptions of intelligence as there are people. Likewise, 
there are as many theories of intelligence as there are intelligence researchers (Thorndike, 
Henmon & Buckingham 1921; Sternberg & Detterman 1986; Neisser et al. 1996). Nevertheless, 
most theorists agree with the folk that intelligence—whatever else it may be—is a capacity 
(broadly understood) to solve problems (broadly understood) comparatively successfully 
(broadly understood) (Deary 2000; Gottfredson 2018; Sternberg 2018). Putting disputes about the 
particulars aside, it is nigh indisputable that the folk are (sometimes) onto something when they 
call people smart, and that what they are onto is approximately what they think they are onto: 
that smart people are better at solving puzzles than dumb people. In this section, I canvass three 
archetypical theories—g-centered theory, the theory of multiple intelligences, and the theory of 
successful intelligence—which indicate the range of scientific attempts to countenance this 
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 First, most active researchers promote what Flynn (2016: 130) calls “g-centered theories.” 
The single most important psychometric finding—rivaled only by the Flynn Effect—is that IQ 
tests and subtests are all intercorrelated. If you do well on one you are likely to do well on all. g-
centered theorists thus take g—the single statistical factor that best captures this fact—to be an 
accurate measure of general intelligence.3 Many g-centered theories propose reducing IQ-test-
taking-abilities to cognitive mechanisms—such as cognitive speed (Jensen 2006) or working 
memory capacity (Oberauer et al. 2005)—or their neural bases—such as the frequency of 
brainwaves (Jensen 2011) or integrated parieto-frontal efficiency (Jung & Haier 2007). Despite 
disagreeing amongst themselves about whether g (Jensen 1999; Gottfredson 2018) or its 
subcomponents (Horn 1965; Cattell 1971; Carroll 1993) are functionally fundamental, g-centered 
theorists all agree that intelligence is objective—it is the thing measured by g on a single, context-
independent, interval scale—and unitary—although general intelligence may have functional 
subcomponents, there is no variety of intelligence which is not accurately measured by g. 
 The second archetype is Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences. Gardner’s 
insight is that people who exhibit intelligence at some tasks (e.g. doing arithmetic) do not 
necessarily exhibit the same degree of intelligence at other tasks (e.g. composing music). 
According to the theory of multiple intelligences, an intelligence is a computational capacity 
which originates in biology and entails the ability to solve problems or fashion products that are 
valued in a cultural setting (Gardner et al. 2018). By defining intelligences as computational 
capacities originating in biology, Gardner aligns himself with the reductionist tendency of g-
centered theories. For Gardner as for most g-centered theorists, a theory must, in the end, 
characterize (an) intelligence as a cog which contributes to the successful functioning of cognitive 
systems. Gardner distances himself from g-centered theorists by downplaying g as a decent but 
imprecise measure of logical-mathematical and linguistic intelligences. Nevertheless, Gardner 
insists that everybody has each of his eight intelligences to some degree. He advocates the 
development of intelligence-specific psychometric tests which can be used to compare each of 




 The third archetype is Robert Sternberg’s theory of successful intelligence. Sternberg’s 
insight, derived from the literature discussed in §2, is that conceptions of intelligence covary with 
conceptions of success. Sternberg infers that “intelligence is one’s ability to achieve success in life 
in terms of one’s personal standards, within one’s socio-cultural context” (Sternberg & 
Grigorenko 2004: 1428). He allows that there may be multiple intelligences, insofar as people 
recognize multiple capacities to achieve different varieties of success. However, Sternberg’s 
 
3 Gould (1996: Ch. 6) provides an accessible breakdown of the factor analytic techniques that generate g. 
Even Jensen’s (1982) otherwise unfailingly negative review praises Gould’s explanation of factor analysis. 
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definition avoids reference to computational capacities or their biological underpinnings. The 
theory of successful intelligence dictates that people’s smarts are assessed relative to their abilities 
to solve puzzles relevant to their lives, without reductionist concern for how their cognitive 
systems function to furnish them with those abilities. 
 Sternberg does not deny the explanatory importance of cognitive mechanisms. To 
complement the theory of successful intelligence, he has developed a theory of how “intelligence 
is realized through a set of information-processing components … of three kinds” (Sternberg 
2018: 307). Nevertheless, Sternberg stresses that this triarchic theory serves only to explain how 
cognitive systems generate intelligence, without allowing the reduction of intelligence to 
information processing. For Gardner, there is cross-cultural variance in how people value each 
objective computational intelligence. For Sternberg, abilities (underlain by information 
processing) emerge as intelligences in some cultures, while not being intelligences in others. 
Sternberg thus takes intelligence(s) to be culture- (and indeed individual-)relative, as well as 
plural. 
 
4. Metaphysics of folk psychological intelligence 
 I aim to develop an empirically adequate metaphysics of folk psychological intelligence—
of the phenomenon folks invoke when they call Buttigieg ‘smart’ or Warren ‘smarter’. The 
evidence supports Sternberg’s view that folks have varying (as well as plural) conceptions of 
intelligence. As Sternberg stresses, people in different contexts do not merely value some 
intelligences more than others. Rather, they recognize distinct patterns of behavior as intelligent, 
which can lead to incommensurate ascriptions. To reject relativism in favor of either variety of 
objectivism—as an account of folk psychological intelligence—would thus be to ascribe 
systematic error to folk ascriptions. Such ascription does not seem justified: Usengeans track 
intelligence—their idiosyncratic idea of intelligence, but intelligence all the same—when they call 
illiterate school dropouts ‘smart’. Their ascriptions enable fecund predictions, explanations, and 
evaluations, and contribute to regulatory folk psychological practices which mindshape their 
community’s youth. 
However, apparent tensions within Sternberg’s account remain. How can intelligence be 
real while being relativized to idiosyncratic ideas thereof? And are low-IQ people not stupider 
than high-IQ people, no matter their cultural backgrounds? Sure, low-IQ people might meet more 
success in some settings. But the fact of their lower IQ remains! Similarly, are some people not 
more musically gifted than others, full stop? Must we refrain from recognizing objective 
intelligence(s) in order to countenance variation in the appreciation (and even recognition) of 
intelligence(s) across contexts? In this section, I import some theoretical structure from the 
philosophy of mind to help resolve these tensions. 
 
4a. Dispositionalism 
 Gilbert Ryle characterized intelligence as being a matter of knowing how to think and act 
correctly. An agent knows how to think and act correctly just in case they have the inclination as 
well as the wherewithal to bring the requisite propositional knowledge and physical capacities 
to bear. Ryle (1945: 15) thus defined intelligence as “a certain dispositional excellence”: a 
propensity for correct thought and action. 
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 Dispositionalist accounts of personality traits (Westra forthcoming) and related 
phenomena ranging from sexual orientation (Dembroff 2016) to war crimes (Talbert & 
Wolfendale 2019) are remarkably uncontroversial. Even philosophers who argue against the 
existence of cross-contextually stable traits accept that, were such traits to exist, they would exist 
qua patterns of dispositions (Flanagan 1991; Harman 1999; Alfano 2013). John Doris (2002) starts 
with the premise that folk psychological personality traits are dispositions, and then argues that 
those dispositions do not exist. Instead, Doris countenances local traits qua dispositions with 
more context-specific activation conditions than the comparatively context-proof traits 
commonly invoked in folk psychology. The question of reducing dispositions to cognitive 
mechanisms does not arise. It is accepted as obvious that, if they exist, personality traits are 
personal-level dispositional properties. 
 Folks likewise do not invoke intelligence—nor, indeed, engage in any folk psychological 
craft—in order to speculate about mechanisms of subpersonal cognitive systems (Dennett 1998; 
Hutto 2011; Curry 2018; McGeer 2018; Almagro Holgado & Fernández Castro forthcoming). They 
do so in order to assess people’s capacities to solve puzzles. It should thus be as uncontroversial 
that folk psychological intelligence is dispositional as it is that personality traits are dispositional. 
After all, intelligence is another trait. As Ryle (1945: 14) argued, calling somebody ‘smart’ or 
‘stupid’ is “describing a part of his character”, and “correspondingly when we describe some 
particular action as clever, witty or wise, we are imputing to the agent the appropriate 
dispositional excellence”: the consonant propensity for correct thought and action.4 
 Like Sternberg, Ryle contrasted his account with attempts to reduce intelligence to the 
neural or cognitive mechanisms that productively cause people to think and act correctly. 
Sternberg could readily accept Ryle’s nonreductive dispositionalism—he would simply add that 
what counts as correct thought and action depends on context-bound conceptions of success in 
puzzle-solving. This addition can fruitfully be understood in terms of interpretivist accounts of 
folk psychological phenomena developed by Ryle’s successors. 
 
4b. Relativistic interpretivism 
 Daniel Dennett amends his mentor’s dispositionalism by introducing the “intentional 
stance”: the strategy of predicting behavior by treating the behaver “as an agent of sorts, with 
beliefs and desires and enough rationality to do what it ought to do given those beliefs and 
desires” (2009: 3). On Dennett’s view, having intentional mental states is nothing more than being 
usefully and voluminously predictable from the intentional stance (see also Davidson 2001). 
Taking a traditional approach to folk psychology centered on belief, desire, rationality, and 
prediction, Dennett largely ignores intelligence and the evaluative and regulatory roles of folk 
 
4 Ryle’s discussion of knowledge-how has inspired more discussion of skills than intelligence (Kremer 2016; 
Fridland 2017; Riley 2017; Stanley & Williamson 2017; Weatherson 2017). The two are closely related, but 
intelligence is intrinsically comparative—saying that somebody is skilled in some domain is not necessarily 
to compare their skill to others’—and more general—being intelligence requires sharp thinking as well as 
smart moves, though which precise bunch of skills it requires depends on the relevant interpreter’s 
stereotype. Whereas this article provides an account of intelligence—qua trait—the literature on skill 
focuses on intelligent action. Of course, since intelligence is a propensity for correct thought and action, the 
two are explanatorily intertwined. 
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psychology. However, from a pluralistic folk psychology perspective, it is easy to see how the 
intentional stance is also geared towards attributions of intelligence. Folks often evaluate people 
they are treating as agents as having the intellectual wherewithal (as well as the beliefs and 
desires) to solve particular puzzles. Folks also often evaluate people as not having the intellectual 
wherewithal, while still treating them as rational agents. 
 For the interpretivist, being intelligent is nothing more than being usefully predictable, 
explicable, evaluable, and regulatable when treated as intelligent via the intentional stance. What 
does it take to be usefully treated as intelligent? Just what Ryle and Sternberg say: it takes being 
comparatively good at solving relevant puzzles. What makes intellectual problems (ir)relevant, 
and what are the pertinent normative standards? That depends on whose intentional stance has 
been brought to bear in order to assess somebody’s intelligence.  
As several philosophers have argued, folk psychological practices often rely on 
stereotypes or other models (Schwitzgebel 2002; Godfrey-Smith 2005; Maibom 2009; Newen 2015; 
Spaulding 2018). When trying to figure out if somebody is smart, we compare their dispositional 
profile to our stereotypical model of an intelligence person. Indeed, Sternberg and lab have found 
that “people have well-formed prototypes corresponding to the various kinds of intelligence 
[which] are used in the evaluation of one’s own and others’ intelligence” (1981: 2). Interpreters 
bring different prototypes to bear when assessing ‘intelligence’, ‘academic intelligence’, and 
‘everyday intelligence’. The differences between these prototypes depend on the varieties of 
puzzle-solving ability the interpreter is interested in assessing. Stereotypically book-smart people 
ably read and write and do arithmetic; stereotypically street-smart people ably make a quick buck 
and read a situation; stereotypically generally intelligent people ably solve whichever puzzles the 
interpreter considers most intellectually challenging. 
In order to defuse charges of instrumentalism and antirealism, Dennett (1991) explains 
that phenomena detectable solely from the intentional stance are nevertheless “real patterns” in 
agents’ propensities. Intelligent people really have the capacity to solve puzzles well, 
independent of any given interpretation. What taking up the intentional stance and wielding 
models (that help interpreters detect real capacities to solve puzzles) makes possible is the 
emergence of the relevant capacities as intelligences—as capacities which somebody recognizes 
as marking capable people as smart. Because conceptions of intelligence differ, capacities only 
become intelligences relative to this recognition. 
Intelligence—the propensity to solve puzzles comparatively well—is a real pattern which 
emerges as intelligence relative to interpreters’ models of the intelligent person. On Sternberg’s 
view, people in different cultures adopt different intentional stances, replete with idiosyncratic 
stereotypes, and thereby detect different real patterns when they look for intelligence. Without 
citing the philosophical literature, Sternberg writes that “intelligence really is nothing in 
particular, as it is a construct humans have invented, largely to explain why some people are 
better at performing some classes of tasks than others” (2018: 308). Dennett’s notion of real 
patterns shows why Sternberg is wrong about the first part, even though he is right about the 
second part. Intelligence is real, despite being a construct which humans (unwittingly) invented 
for the purpose Sternberg identifies, and despite assuming different forms in relation to different 
stereotypes. 
Sternberg is also wrong to define intelligence as one’s ability to achieve success in terms 
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of one’s personal standards. The relevant standards are not (only) the intelligent person’s own. A 
teacher from San Jose could aptly assess an Usengean child’s intelligence according to her own 
parochial stereotype, from her idiosyncratic intentional stance, even while recognizing that the 
child’s uncle aptly assesses her intelligence differently, according to his own parochial stereotype, 
from his idiosyncratic intentional stance. As I have argued elsewhere (Curry 2020), interpretivists 
ought to countenance mental phenomena that emerge relative to each and every interpreter’s 
point of view. Like Dennett, I embrace the consequence that folk psychological phenomena like 
intelligence are (at least sometimes) intersubjectively indeterminate: the American teacher and 
Usengean uncle’s respective ascriptions of stupidity and smartness are incommensurate, even 
though neither of them is wrong. There is no single, objective fact of the matter about whether or 
not the Usengean child is intelligent. Instead, there are two objective facts: she is intelligent for 
her uncle, but unintelligent for the American teacher. 
So, must we refrain from recognizing objective intelligence(s) in order to countenance 
variation in the appreciation (even recognition) of intelligence(s) across contexts? No. Instead, we 
must refrain from taking the existence of objective facts about folk psychological intelligence to 
preclude (the further objective fact) that it emerges relative to folk psychological models. Some 
people are objectively stupider than others, relative to some models, no matter their cultural 
backgrounds. The real lesson of Sternberg’s research is that those people are not necessarily 
stupider relative to every model. Thus, scientists who wish to unveil objective facts about 
intelligence—qua object of folk psychological practices—must study folk psychological models 
as well as puzzle-solving capacities. 
 
4c. Modelling intelligence 
Model-theoretic accounts of folk psychology improve on their traditional counterparts by 
neatly accounting for interpreters’ dual abilities to think abstractly about the general conditions 
on possession of a given mental state and to think practically about what it would take for a 
particular agent to possess that mental state in a particular context. Like scientists, folks have both 
“an understanding of a general structure or schematic pattern that can have many specific 
instantiations” and “the ability to construct specific hypothetical systems to deal with particular 
empirical cases”; thus, “folk-psychological attributors can rapidly put together specific, filled-out 
psychological profiles, to explain and predict the actions of individual agents” (Godfrey-Smith 
2005: 4–6). By accounting for both general-purpose and target-specific models, model-theoretic 
accounts uniquely reveal how interpreters “manage to systematize an extraordinary range of 
phenomena and understand them as different manifestations of the same general principles” 
(Maibom 2009: 374–375). A model-theoretic interpretivism about intelligence should thus aspire 
to account for the varieties of intelligence that emerge in relation to both general-purpose and 
target-specific models. It should also illuminate the modelled relationships between intelligence 
and other folk psychological phenomena, such as beliefs, desires, and personality traits. 
The empirical research reveals a diversity of general-purpose models of intelligence, 
which subsume a diversity of relationships between intelligence and other phenomena. 
Extremely thin general-purpose models of intelligence—focused solely on fluid intelligence, for 
example—might be belief-, desire-, and personality-neutral. In other words, being intelligent in 
relation to a thin model might entail nothing whatsoever about what somebody believes or 
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desires, or what kind of person they are. Assuming interpretivism about all folk psychological 
phenomena,5 the patterns of dispositions that constitute beliefs, desires, and traits might have 
zero overlap with the pattern of dispositions that constitutes intelligence (relative to a thin model 
thereof).  
At the same time, thick general-purpose models of intelligence—focused on crystallized 
intelligence, for example—often incorporate beliefs, desires, and personality traits. Being 
intelligent in relation to a thick model might entail having ample (or the proper) true beliefs, 
desiring to act in productive manners, or being focused, persistent, or ambitious. For example, 
the Usengean uncle’s model of intelligence might entail true beliefs about herbal remedies, and 
the wherewithal to apply those beliefs in stressful situations. If somebody lacks the patterns of 
dispositions that constitute the relevant beliefs, desires, or traits (relative to the Usengean uncle’s 
model thereof), then they also lack the pattern of dispositions that constitutes intelligence (relative 
to the Usengean uncle’s model thereof).  
Many general-purpose models of intelligence plausibly fall in-between these thin and 
thick extremes. In most models, there may be substantial overlap between the patterns of 
dispositions that constitute intelligence and the patterns that constitute certain beliefs, without 
being intelligent entailing that somebody has all such beliefs. (There may be ways of fitting one 
pattern while evading another, even though most people who fit one fit both.)6  
Target-specific models lend further complexity. Folks who know enough about 
somebody’s intellectual talents often construct a model of their idiosyncratic ability to solve 
idiosyncratic puzzles better (or worse) than others. Buttigieg, Harris, Sanders, and Warren are 
intelligent—they each sufficiently fit my general-purpose model of intelligence. But they are 
intelligent in different ways; they are each distinctively good at solving distinctive puzzles. 
Buttigieg “is a classic [bookish] Smart Dude” (Featherstone 2019), whereas Sanders is  
“thoughtful” (Stein 2016). I accordingly complement my general-purpose model with target-
specific models of each of the Democratic candidates’ idiosyncratic varieties of intelligence. My 
target-specific model of Sherlock Holmes’s intelligence is thinner—less messily loaded with 
particular beliefs—than my model of Hercule Poirot’s intelligence. (Holmes’s detective work 
 
5 I entertain this assumption for the sake of illustration, but it plays no role in my argument. Indeed, I think 
it is false if read literally; folk psychological models incorporate phenomena, such as perceptual 
representations, that exist absolutely (not relative to interpretation). The conclusion of this article is that 
interpretivism is the best account of intelligence (whether or not it accounts for any other folk psychological 
phenomena). 
6 It might be asked, with regard to these cases of overlap, whether attributions of intelligence or attributions 
of belief take precedence. I doubt there is any straightforward answer to this question. One of the salutary 
advances of pluralistic approaches to folk psychology has been to challenge (Andrews 2012) or complicate 
(Westra 2018, 2019) the Dennettian(/Davidsonian) claim that belief, desire, and rationality lie at the heart 
of all folk conceptions of the mental—and are thus the primary targets of every intentional stance. It is 
plausible that, sometimes, folks start with the ascription of a certain level and variety of intelligence, and 
ascribe beliefs only secondarily, to flesh out their psychological profile of a smart (or stupid) agent. 
However, in my view, the relationships between folk psychological phenomena cannot be determined a 
priori; we must await detailed evidence about how folks actually model agents. 
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hinges on deducing (or abducing) the natural meaning of clues; Poirot’s hinges on beliefs about 
people’s psychological proclivities.) 
 There is unity amidst this variation in models: they are all models of how comparatively 
good people are at solving puzzles. Otherwise, they would not be models of intelligence. Even 
my pluralistic, relativistic interpretivism does not allow that literally anything goes. Moreover, 
there is undoubtedly substantial overlap between how folks model intelligence across many 
contexts. Many—perhaps all—folks model aptitude for puzzle-solving as incorporating the 
abilities to produce correct answers (and achieve useful results) when tackling known puzzles 
and to learn quickly how to solve novel puzzles. 
Nevertheless, folks do not identify intelligence with its universally agreed upon features, 
much less its sparse universal definition. Instead, folks identify intelligence with the actual 
patterns of propensities that fit their context-bound conceptions of intelligence. When wielding 
thick models, folks take as part and parcel of intelligence dispositions to act in line with true 
beliefs, wise desires, and sage-like personality traits. As Ryle (1949: 328) put it, the distinctive 
ways people live in accordance with folk psychological models—"their doings, sayings, and 
imaginings, their grimaces, gestures and tones of voice”—are “the stuff and not the mere 
trappings” of intelligence. My interpretivism thus does countenance lots—and lots of kinds—of 
variation amidst the unity; that is what an account of folk psychological intelligence should 
deliver, given the multitudinous varieties of intelligence that have actually been invoked in folk 
psychological practices around the globe throughout history. 
 
4d. Against reduction 
 Resistance to interpretivism about propositional attitudes usually shares its roots with the 
emphasis on belief and desire in traditional approaches to folk psychology: the twin convictions 
that cognitive science offers an explanatory framework which casts beliefs and desires as cogs in 
cognitive systems, and that folk psychological ascriptions target these cogs. Whatever one makes 
of these convictions,7 it is more difficult to make the case that folk psychological ascriptions of 
intelligence latch onto cogs in cognitive systems. Rampant cross-cultural variation in models of 
intelligence suggests that we ought not assume that everybody, everywhere, is always accurately 
tracking the same cog (or set of multiple cogs) whenever they ascribe intelligence. 
 Moreover, in stark contrast to the facsimiles of folk psychological models of belief that 
pervade cognitive science (Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum 2018), notions of intelligence play next 
to no role in cognitive scientific explanations. Intelligence is a huge topic in differential 
psychology, but is almost never discussed in cognitive psychology or neuroscience. Richard 
Haier—a leading proponent of the cognitive neuroscience of intelligence—allows that “more than 
a few … cognitive neuroscience studies of reasoning do not use the word intelligence” (2017: 124). 
What attempts there have been to individuate a functional (computational or neural) role for 
intelligence have had mixed results. Haier’s influential g-centered parieto-frontal integration 
theory purports to localize intelligence, but does not attempt to identify it with a functionally 
individuated neural mechanism (Jung & Haier 2007: 176). And there is no empirically supported 
theory of computational architecture grounding Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences. 
 
7 Arguments for: Fodor (1987), Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum (2018). Against: Ryle (1949); Curry (2018). 
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Nevertheless, notions of intelligence pervade folk psychological practices. Intelligence is 
thus a perfect candidate for a mental phenomenon which exists relative to interpretation, rather 
than being reducible to cognitive functioning. 
I am not asserting that any variety of intelligence floats free of underlying cognitive 
processes, nor that the cognitive etiology of intelligence is unworthy of study. I am asserting that 
cognitive processes do not themselves constitute intelligence—qua object of folk psychological 
practices—and that the patterns of dispositions they generate constitute intelligence only relative 
to folk psychological models. The latter assertion is backed up empirically—via the existence of 
significant cross- and intra-cultural diversity in conceptions of smarts—and conceptually—via 
the normativity at the heart of intelligence, which requires that intelligence be understood relative 
to folks’ standards of successful thought and behavior. The former assertion is backed up by the 
fact that cognitive scientists have no use for facsimiles of folk psychological models of intelligence 
at mechanistic levels of explanation. None of this is to deny the fecundity of differential 
psychology. But it is to deny—as cognitive psychologists (implicitly) deny by leaving intelligence 
out of their models of cognition—the objectivist thesis that the ascriptions of intelligence 
pervading folk psychological practices target functional cogs in cognitive systems.  
Indeed, I would deny objectivism about folk psychological intelligence even if cognitive 
psychological intelligence were vindicated. Although the present paucity of intelligence-talk in 
cognitive psychology is telling, I will not pretend it is probative. Working memory capacity could 
be intelligence in sheep’s clothing (Oberauer et al. 2005; Carruthers 2014; cf. Shipstead & Engle 
2018); although the case for this identification rests on strong correlations with measures of fluid 
g in particular, it is possible that working memory plays a key role in generating each and every 
variety of intelligence invoked by folks around the world and throughout history. Interpretivists 
about folk psychological intelligence can afford to be agnostic about this possibility (and other 
possible realizations of folk psychological intelligence by cognitive or neural mechanisms). Even 
if working memory does lie at the root of all varieties of folk psychological intelligence, it is not 
their functional underpinnings that make them varieties of intelligence. On the contrary, if they 
bear the right relation to folk psychological models thereof, then patterns of dispositions 
constitute folk psychological intelligences no matter how they are realized at cognitive or neural 
levels of explanation. (They may be multiply realized.) Interpretivism is a sound account of folk 
psychological intelligence whether or not scientists devise a unifying etiological story about the 
mechanisms responsible for folk psychological intelligence. 
 
5. Further puzzles to solve 
 To recap: intelligence is a real pattern of dispositions to tackle puzzles (that a pattern-
detector deems worth solving) comparatively well. That is how intelligence can be real yet 
relativized to idiosyncratic ideas thereof. This interpretivism is an account of folk psychological 
intelligence, but not a complete account of the folk psychology of intelligence. The latter will 
require a fuller understanding of how folks model intelligence in relation to other folk 
psychological phenomena, and of how various folk psychological methods employing these 
models together serve various folk psychological goals (Spaulding 2018; Westra 2019). 
 Sympathetic and skeptical readers alike may still be wondering what IQ tests measure, 
such that they strongly intercorrelate with each other and with prestigious varieties of success in 
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life. This question deserves a substantive reply, which I look forward to providing in future 
writing. In the meantime, it will suffice to adumbrate that reply, and preemptively point out that 
interpretivists about folk psychological intelligence can afford to be agnostic in the debate about 
g, just as we can afford to be agnostic about intelligence qua object of cognitive 
(neuro)psychology. It is possible that g cleanly measures the latter (by tracking working memory 
capacity, perhaps). Regardless, interpretivism best accounts for folk psychological intelligence, 
since not all folks everywhere value intelligence qua (correlative of) IQ. 
Although I formally recommend agnosticism, I am attracted to extending interpretivism 
to countenance intelligence-as-measured-by-g. To be smart—either in the way measured by IQ 
tests or in the ways commonly depicted in folk discourse—is not just to process information 
faster, or to have greater integrated parieto-frontal neural efficiency, or to have greater working 
memory capacity. Instead, to be smart is to be comparatively good at solving intellectual 
problems. Intelligence is an irreducibly normative notion: it is not just a capacity to think, but to 
think well—indeed, to think better than others. And what counts as thinking better depends on 
the normative standards set by whoever endeavors to detect the relevant capacity (be they Binet 
or your Usengean uncle). To be smart relative to the WEIRD standards set by psychometricians 
is to be comparatively good at solving the puzzles that constitute IQ tests (Van der Maas et al. 
2014). The real patterns of success in thinking detected by IQ tests are also detected in some folk 
discourse, especially since IQ testing has warped popular conceptions of intelligence in 
standardized-test-obsessed American culture. In other folk psychological practices, IQ and 
intelligence are conceived as strikingly distinct. So, g is a measure of something (often) different 
from, though related to, folk psychological intelligence. Both the scientific construct and the many 
folk constructs warrant more careful study. 
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